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An  important  objective  of  Japanese  agricul-  wheat price  on Japanese  wheat imports  (Green-
tural policy  since  the early  1960s has been  to in-  shields).  This study provides a more comprehen-
crease farm incomes by raising the farm price of  sive framework for analysis  of Japanese  agricul-
rice,  the  country's  principal  agricultural  crop  tural  policies  by  considering  explicitly  the  in-
(Hayami).  This  objective  was  accomplished  teraction of Japanese  rice and wheat policies.  An
through  a  two-tiered  pricing  scheme  adminis-  econometric  model  of the  Japanese  rice  and
tered  by the  Japanese  Food  Agency,  the  coun-  wheat sectors  is estimated  and used to  quantify
try's principal purchaser and seller of rice, which  the  trade  impacts  of Japan's  current  rice  and
maintained  producer  support  prices  at  levels  wheat policies.
higher  than the consumer  equivalent.  However,
in recent years,  the  accumulation  of excess rice
stocks  has  forced  Japan's  policymakers  to  im-  RICE  AND  WHEAT  POLICY  IN  JAPAN
plement  major changes  in rice  policy  to  reduce
persistent  overproduction.  These  policies  in-  Pricing  and  marketing  of rice  and  wheat  are
elude  diversion  payment programs  that provide  controlled  by  the  Japanese  Food  Agency,  ac-
incentives to  divert paddy land to production  of  cording  to  the  Food Control  Law  of  1942.  Do-
priority  crops  such  as  wheat,  barley,  and  soy-  mestic  rice  and  wheat  prices form  a two-tiered
beans, as  well as  surplus  disposal programs  that  price system, with high prices for producers  and
subsidize the disposal of accumulated rice stocks  lower prices for consumers;  losses on purchases
for export,  industrial,  and feed use. Other policy  and  sales are absorbed  by the government.
changes  include  adjustments  in  the  wholesale  Rice is  sold either  directly to the  government
(resale)  prices  of  rice  and  wheat  to  favor  rice  or to  officially  designated  dealers  (mainly  local
consumption,  and  adjustments  in producer  sup-  cooperatives),  who  constitute  a  "semi-con-
port prices to promote production  of competing  trolled"  market.2 Rice  prices fixed  by the  gov-
crops. This study analyzes the impact on trade of  ernment  are  applied  only  to  government-con-
recent  changes  in  Japanese  rice  and  wheat pol-  trolled  purchases.  However,  because  of  the
icy.  availability  of "standard  grade rice"  at govern-
Japan's  rice  policy  affects  the  international  ment prices,  it is often difficult to  sell rice from
rice and wheat markets because of the substitut-  the  "semi-controlled"  market  at  competitive
ability  between  the  two  commodities.  Japan's  levels  (Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Forestry  and
exports  of  surplus  rice  compete  with  exports  Fisheries,  Food  Agency).
from  the  more  traditional  suppliers  such  as the  Wheat imports are controlled  by the Japanese
United States.l  At the  same time, domestic pric-  Food  Agency  through quota  arrangements  with
ing policies  and  programs  that promote produc-  licensed  traders.3 In principle,  wheat producers
tion  of  wheat  and/or  promote  consumption  of  are free to  sell their crops to any purchaser,  but
rice  affect Japanese  demand  for wheat  imports.  in practice,  almost all sales  are made to the gov-
The impact of rice and wheat policies on Japan's  ernment  because  of  the  high  government  pur-
wheat imports  is  of interest to the United  States  chase price.
because Japan is a major importer of U.S. wheat.  Government  policies  designed  to  reduce  the
Previous  studies  of Japanese  agriculture  have  accumulation  of rice  stocks  affect  wheat  trade
focused  on the  social  costs  of agricultural  pro-  through  the  use  of three  policy  tools:  govern-
grams  (Bale  and  Greenshields;  Bale),  or  have  ment-determined  resale prices of rice and wheat;
analyzed  the  effect  of a  change  in  the  resale  government-determined  producer  support
Agricultural Economist,  International  Commodity Policy  Section, Trade Policy Branch, International  Economics Division, Economic  Research Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture,  Washington,  D.C.  20250.
This paper has benefited from comments  by  Annie Kester,  Michael  Lopez and Philip Paarlberg.  William  Coyle also participated in the early development of the paper.
Views  expressed in this  paper are not  necessarily those  of the USDA.
Japan agreed  to restrict  rice exports to about 400,000  tons (milled) over a period of four years during U.S.-Japanese  consultations  in April  1980. Additional trade impacts
for feed  grains  could result from  disposal of rice in livestock feed. The  current  surplus disposal program,  which  began  in 1979-80,  plans for feed disposal  starting  in 1981.
Trade  impacts of Japanese policies  on feed  use are not discussed  in this paper.
2  This partially free market  was established in  1969 in order to reduce  the cost of rice control to the government  and to improve the quality of rice marketed  (Organisation
for Economic  Co-operation and  Development,  1974).
3 Wheat imports are physically  managed by licensed  traders  who sell  all imported  wheat  to the government  at the port.
133prices;  and  diversion payments  for rice produc-  (domestic  supply  and market  clearing,  the  latter
ers,  which promote  the  production  of wheat  at  defining  wheat  imports).  The  rice  sector  has  4
the  expense  of  rice.  Rice  diversion  programs  behavioral  equations  (acreage,  yield,  domestic
have  been in effect  since  1969  (see Organisation  consumption,  and  rice  export);  and  2 identities
for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development,  (domestic  supply  and market  clearing,  the  latter
1979,  for a description  of these programs).  defining rice  stocks).
The  interaction  of rice and wheat policies and  The  Japanese  Food  Agency  has  been  the  re-
their impact on wheat trade is shown in Figure 1,  sidual claimant for surplus rice stocks over much
where  D and  S represent Japanese  domestic  de-  of the  estimation  period.  For  this  reason,  rice
mand  and  supply for wheat.  Wheat  imports are  stocks  are  assumed  equal  to  the  difference  be-
equal to the quantity Q0 - Q1 at the wheat resale  tween  Japan's  supply  and  demand  for  rice.  In
price  of PRW  and  the  producer  price  of PPW.  contrast,  wheat  stocks  accumulated  by  the
Increases in the resale and producer wheat prices  agency  are  assumed  to  be  desired,  based  upon
to  levels represented  by PRW'  and PPW'  result  the  government's  requirements  for  working
in  a decrease  in wheat  imports  to  Q2  - Q4.4 In  and/or food security  stocks.  A wheat yield equa-
addition,  payments  to  divert  paddy  land  from  tion was  not estimated  because  yields appear to
rice  to  wheat,  resulting  in  a  shift  in  the  wheat  have  remained  fairly  stable over  the  estimation
supply  schedule  from  S  to  S',  further  reduce  period.
wheat imports to  Q3 - Q4.
To the extent that the above policies result in a  Wheat Sector
reduction in the imbalance  between rice produc-
tion and consumption,  rice supplies available for  The specification  of the wheat model  is
future  surplus  disposal  decline.  Japan  is  cur-
rently  implementing  a  5-year  surplus  disposal  (  AW  = al  +  B 1 AWt 1 +
program,  begun  in  1979-80,  to dispose  of accu-  B12 PPWt_1/PPIt_- +
mulated  excess  rice  stocks  through  subsidized  B 1 A  PPRM  T/PPIt  +  B  /
use as feed,  in industrial use,  and as exports. 14 MANtC  t + BDV  t-P +
1it,
STRUCTURAL  ECONOMETRIC  MODEL  (2)  QDWt  =  2 +  B 21 Yt/CPIt  +
B22 PRWt/CPIt  +  B23 PRRt/CPIt + The empirical  model of the Japanese  rice  and 
wheat  sectors  is  comprised  of  11  equations,  of  2
which  7  are  behavioral.  The wheat  sector has  3  (3)  AWS t = c3  + B31 WSt_  B32 EXRt  +
behavioral  equations  (acreage,  domestic  con-  B 3 D  + E3
sumption,  and  wheat inventory)  and 2  identities
(4)  QWSt  =  (AWt)  * (YDWt),
s  (5)  MWt  =  QDWt  * POPt  +  AWSt-  QWSt
P  i/S
where t refers to the time period.  AW is acreage
planted in wheat;  PPW,  the government  support
price  for wheat; PPI,  an index of prices paid for
inputs,  1975=1000;  PPR,  the  government  sup-
port  price for rice;  MAN,  an index of wages  in
the  manufacturing  sector,  1975=1000;  CPI,  the
consumer  price  index,  1975= 1000;  DV,  pay-
,  _~~PPW'  ___~  /  L  \  ___  ments  paid to  producers  to  divert  paddy  land;
PPW'  QDW,  per  capita  wheat  consumption;  Y,  per
PRW'  \—1  capita gross national product; PRW, the govern-
~PRW'  —/A\  —  f^—~~  'ment  resale price of wheat;  PRR, the retail price
PRW'  /  I  I  of rice;  WS,  ending wheat inventory;  EXR,  the
/  /  i  j  \  x  U.S. $/yen exchange rate; D3,  a dummy variable
l  1  §  I  \  representing  Japanese  policy  to  hold  larger
,_III________  I  \D  stocks,  1975-76-1977-78  =1,  =0  all  other
Qo  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q wheat  years; QWS, total domestic wheat supply; YDW,
wheat  yield;  MW,  wheat  imports;  and  POP,
FIGURE  1.  Impact  of  Japanese  Rice  and  population.  The  es represent  random residuals.
Wheat Policies  on Wheat Trade  Equation (1) is based upon standard Nerlovian
supply  response,  with  adaptive  expectations  in
4 Wheat producers  have been given increased  incentive  to produce wheat  since 1974,  when bonus  payments were  announced in addition to the support price. The bonus
payment  was  incorporated  into  the  wheat  support  price  in  1976.  Rice  producers  also  receive  additional  incentive  payments  to  double-crop  rice  and  wheat.  On the
consumption side,  announced  increases in the resale  wheat  price were  larger than increases in the rice resale  price for  1980  and  1981.
134which  acreage  planted  in wheat is  a function  of  (9)  REXt  =  a9 +  Bgl  RSt-  +-
the expected prices of wheat, competitive crops,  Bg2 (D4*PTRt-_/PICt_)  + B93 D3  +
and  inputs.  This  formulation  is  used  because  £9t,
government  support  prices  are  not  announced
until after the  decisions  to  plant  the  crops have  (10)  QRSt  =  (ARt) * (YDRt),
been made.  The coefficient  B 1 measures the ad-
justment  of actual  acreage  to  desired  acreage.  (11)  ARSt  =  QRSt  - QDRt  * POPt  - REXt.
MAN  represents  the  opportunity  cost of wheat
production  in  terms  of income  that  could  be  AR is  acreage  planted  in rice;  PFI,  an index of
earned  in  the  non-farm  sector.  The  diversion  prices paid for fertilizer,  1975=1000; PPV, an in-
payment  variable  DV  represents  additional  re-  dex of prices paid for vegetables, 1975=1000;  D1,
turns  to  wheat  production,  and  is  expressed  in  a dummy variable representing a change in diver-
current  terms  because  these  payments  are  an-  sion  policy  that  discontinued  payments  for  fal-
nounced  in advance  of the planting  season.  lowed  land,  1961-62-1973-74  =0,  =1  other-
Equation  (2)  is a reduced-form  demand equa-  wise;  YDR,  rice  yield;  D2,  a  dummy  variable
tion  derived  from  a consumer  demand  function  representing  low  rice  yields  not  attributable  to
for wheat noodles,  a supply function for the  in-  economic  factors,  1971-72  and  1976-77  =1,  =0
termediate  marketing  sector,  and a market clear-  otherwise; QDR, per capita consumption  of rice;
ing  identity.  Equation  (3)  relates  government-  PR, resale price  of rice; PN, retail price of dried
held  wheat  stocks  to  economic  and  policy  vari-  wheat noodles;  PF, index of retail prices of fish,
ables.  The Japanese  Food Agency  is assumed to  1975-76= 1000;  REX,  rice  exports;  RS,  ending
have  a desired  or target level of stocks to which  rice stocks;  PTR, export price of Thai rice; PIC,
adjustment  in the  current period  is measured  by  import price of corn; D4,  dummy variable repre-
the  coefficient  B31. The  exchange  rate  EXR  is  senting  disposal  of  rice  for  feed,  1970-71-
included  in  place  of the  world  wheat  price  be-  1973-74  =1,  =0 otherwise;  QRS,  total  rice sup-
cause  domestic  wheat  prices  are  controlled  by  ply;  and  all  other  variables  were  defined  pre-
the  government:  thus  there  is  no  incentive  for  viously.
speculative  stockholding.  In addition, money for  Equations  (6)  and (8)  are specified  similarly to
purchase  of imported  wheat  is  allocated  in  the  equations  (1) and  (2).  In  addition,  the  price  of
budget  at the  start  of the  fiscal year,  so that  a  fish,  PF, is  included in (2)  on the assumption of
change  in the exchange  rate  will increase  or de-  its  complementarity  to  rice.  Equation  7  relates
crease the amount of allocated money in terms of  intensification  of fields to  acreage  and  expected
dollars.  It is  expected  that an  increase  in  EXR  prices.  Equation (9) relates the supply of rice ex-
will  raise the cost of imported wheat to the gov-  ports to  the  level  of carry-in  rice  stocks,  RSt 1,
ernment  and  decrease  the  amount  of wheat  im-  and  expected international  rice and corn prices.
ported for storage.  D3  is included in equation  (3)  Rice  stocks  are  included  because  the  govern-
to  account  for  the  government's  policy  to  in-  ment's  decision to  export is based upon  its sup-
crease  stocks after the period of international  in-  ply  of surplus  stocks.  The  ratio  between  world
stability,  1973-75.  Equations  4  and  5  are  iden-  rice and  corn  prices is  important  to the  govern-
tities that define total domestic wheat supply and  ment in rationing  surplus stocks between  export
wheat imports.  and  feed  use.  This  variable  is  relevant  only  in
periods  when a program for disposing of surplus
Rice  Sector  rice  in  feed  is  in  operation  (1970-73).  Without
such  a program,  ordinary  use  of rice  as feed  is
The  specification  of the rice  sector model is  insignificant because  of the relationship between
internal Japanese  rice prices  and  those of other
(6)  ARt = a6 + B 61 ARt_  + B 62 PPRt_1/PFtI,  +  feed ingredients.  Equation  10 is an identity defin-
B 6 PPW/PPIt-_  + B64PPVt_/PFIt_,  +  ing the total domestic  supply  of rice,  and  equa-
B 65 DVt/PPIt-_  +  B 66 MANt/CPIt  +  tion  11  is  the  market  clearing  identity  defining
B 67 D1  +C6t,  rice stocks.6
(7)  YDRt  =  a7 +  B 71 ARt  +
B72 PPRt_ 1 /PFIt_ 1 +  B 73 D2  + C 71,  MODEL  ESTIMATION
It was assumed  that prices are not determined
(8)  QDRt  = a8  +  B 81 Yt/CPIt  +  endogenously  in  the  model  because  of govern-
B 82 PRt/PNt  +  B 83 PFt/CPIt  + E8t,  ment  price  control at the  retail,  wholesale,  and
5 Specifically,  the three equations from which the wheat demand function is estimated  are: (a) QDN = f(PN,  PRR,  Z); (b) QDW = f(PN,  PRW,); and (c)  QDN = a QDW,
where QDN is consumption of wheat noodles,  and  Z represents  other exogenous  factors.  Eliminating PN in (b) and substituting  into (a), and  substituting (c)  into (a) obtains
the reduced form  equation  (d)  QDW  = f(PRW,  PRR,  Z).  Alternatively,  it  could be  assumed  that retail  margins are  constant over time.
6 Diversion of rice into industrial  and feed use is not included in equation  11. Diversion into industrial use has had almost no effect on stocks, because it basically replaces
new-crop rice with old-crop stocks and results in little or no net stock drawdown. Use of rice in processed feed has been negligible, except during the  1970-73 surplus disposal
program.  No behavioral  equation  for disposal of rice as feed could  be estimated  because of the  lack of sufficient observations.
135producer  levels.  Therefore,  ordinary  least  related  to  wheat  acreage  (equations  1 and  6).
squares (OLS) yields consistent and unbiased es-  Crops  to  which  paddy  land  has  been  diverted
timates  of the parameters  for equations  1-3  and  over the period of the diversion programs include
6-9.  The  period of estimation  is for  1961-62  to  forage,  vegetable crops, and fruits. However, re-
1977-78,  except  for  the  rice  export  equation,  cent increases  in diversion payments make wheat
which  was  estimated  for  the  period  1969-70  to  more competitive with rice,  as well as with other
1977-78.7 crops.  The  negative  coefficient  of MAN  in both
Results  of estimation,  shown in Table  1, indi-  equations  indicates  that increases  in wages  have
cate that rice diversion payments (DV) have been  been  an  important  factor  in  reducing  acreage
an important factor in reducing rice acreage  over  both  of wheat  and  rice  over  the  estimation
the period of estimation, but are not significantly  period.
TABLE  1.  OLS Estimates  of Structural Equations,  Japanese  Wheat and Rice Sector Model,  1960-77
No.  Estimated  Equationa
1.  AWt  =  342.699  +  .678  AWt-1  +  .002  PPWt-l/PPIt-l
(1.372)  (3.452)  (1.962)
- 3.691  MANt/CPIt  - .001 PPRt/PPIt1  +  .020  DVt/PPIt 1 2=  .99
(-1.787)  (-2.500)  (.417)  n  =  17
2.  QDWt  =  .066  - .055  Yt/CPIt  - .0003  PRWt/CPIt  +  .0002  PRRt/CPIt  R
2 =  .84
(9.665)  (-2.019)  (-4.160)  (2.079)  DW  =  1.75
n=  17
3.  AWS t =  1790.330  - 1.071  WSt 1 - 2.005  EXRt  +  395.750  D3  R  .68
(4.509)  (-5.554)  (-2.474)  (4.357)  DW  =  1.65
n  =  17
6.  ARt  =  2833.700  +  .265  ARt_ 1 +  990.568  PPRt_-/PFIt_-
(5.760)  (2.120)  (5.661)
- .005  PPWt-1/PPIt-1  - 606.262  PPVt_-/PFIt_1  - .337  DVt/PPIt_-
(-1.496)  (-5.760)  (-4.071)
- 6.784  MANt/CPIt  +  355.498  D1  R2  .99
(-2.245)  (3.152)  n  =  17
7.  YDRt  =  5.275  - .0006  ARt  +  .889  PPRt/PFIt  - .414  D2  =  .69 t  _,/PF9t  - .414  D2  .69
(5.621)  (-2.622)  (2.641)  (-2.709)  DW  =  1.20
n=  17
8.  QDRt  =  .171  - .029  Yt/CPIt  - .0001  PRt/PNt  - .0002  PFt/CPIt  R  =  .98
(48.552)  (-4.868)  (-3.505)  (-2.114)  DW  =  1.43
n =  17
9.  REXt =  -102.940  +  .065  RSt_ 1 +  83.899(D4*  PTRt_i/PICt_1)
(-1.038)  (4.678)  (2.641)
226.543  D3  R2  =  .95
(-3.316)  DW  =  2.30
n =  9
a  t-values in parentheses.
7 The  data are on a Japanese fiscal year basis,  April-March,  except for wheat  data which are on  a July-June  basis. The rice export equation was estimated from  1969-77
because previously, Japan was a large net importer  of rice.  Data for estimation  were obtained from the Japan  Prime Minister's Office,  Ministry of Agriculture,  Forestry  and
Fisheries,  and  U.S. Department  of Agriculture,  Foreign  Agricultural  Service (FAS).
136Negative coefficients for Yt in both the rice and  TABLE  2.  Estimate of Elasticities  at Means
wheat demand equations  (equations 3 and  8) in-
dicate  that  per-capita  consumption  of  these  Wheata  Rice
commodities  has  not  decreased  with  income.  Elasticities  Short  Lon  Short  LunR
These results were  also obtained by Greenshields
and by the U.S. Department of Agriculture Eco-  ()  Price  elasticity2.30  .31  .42
of  supply  .74  2.30  .31  .42
nomics,  Statistics,  and  Cooperatives  Service.  (2)  ross  price
elasticity  of
Per-capita  consumption of rice in Japan  has  de-  supply  -.76  -2.36  -. 18  -.25
dined continuously since  1962,  and consumption  (3)  Price  elasticity
of  demand  - -. 33  - -. 08
b
of wheat products has  declined  in recent years.  (4)  Cross  price
Consumption of animal products  has increased at  elastici  - .11
the same  time (Roberts,  et al.).  (5)  Diversion  payment
The negative coefficient for EXR in equation 3  elasticity  .02  .07  -. 03  -.04
indicates  that the cost of foreign  exchange is an
important element in determining the demand for  a  The estimated wheat production elasticities are computed
wheat  stocks.  This result  suggests  some fxibil-  from  a  smaller  base  than  estimated  rice  production  elas- wheat stocks.  This result  suggests  some flexibil-  ticities.
ity  based  upon  cost factors  in Japanese  wheat  b  Price variable is ratio of resale rice price to the retail price
import quotas. The coefficient of WSt- 1 indicates  of noodles.
almost  perfect  adjustment  of  actual  to  desired
stock  levels.  Estimation  results  also  indicate
that, during the  earlier  surplus disposal program
1.970-71-1973-74,  the  volume  of  rice  exported  specified changes  (see Novakavic and Thompson
was  partly  determined  by relative  prices  of rice  for  a  description  of  this  procedure).  No  price
and imported corn (equation  7).  changes were  made  after year 2.
The base year chosen was  1973  because this is
the last  year for which  data  are available  when
VALIDATION  Japan  was administering  a surplus rice disposal,
as well  as  a  diversion  program.  Since  Japan  is
To validate the model,  Newton's Method was  currently administering  a 5-year surplus disposal
used  to  simultaneously  solve  the  eleven  equa-  program  (1979-80-1984-85)  and  a  10-year  di-
tions  in the model  over  a nine-year  period  from  version  program  (1978-79-1988-89),  it  is  be-
1969  to  1977  (see  Jabara  for complete  details).8 lieved that current  conditions  are similar to that
Predicted  values  closely  followed  the  trends  of  earlier period.
actual values.  Deviations  between predicted and  The simulated impact  of the price  changes are
actual values  averaged  less  than  10  percent  for  summarized in Table 3. Simulation I presents the
rice production,  wheat  imports,  wheat  and  rice  impact  of an  11.0-percent  increase  in the  resale
consumption,  and  wheat  stocks.  Deviations  be-  price  of wheat relative to rice, and a 2.4-percent
tween  predicted  and  actual  values  for  wheat  increase  in the  producer price  of wheat relative
acreage  averaged less  than 27 percent,  with the  to  rice from  1973  base  values.9 Similar percent-
largest  deviations  in  1974  (the  first year  of the  age  increases  in  resale  prices  were  effective  in
wheat bonus program) and in  1977.  Rice exports  February,  1980,  and  a  similar  percentage  in-
are  over-estimated  in  1975-77,  years  in  which  crease in the wheat producer price went into  ef-
Japanese  rice  exports  were  small.  Estimated  fect for the 1979-80 crop year.  Simulation results
production  and  consumption  elasticities  are  indicate  projected  changes  in  the  endogenous
shown in Table 2.  variables  following  these  price  changes  (year-2
values),  as  well  as  the  projected  cumulative
changes,  under  the  assumption  the  policies  are
SIMULATION  RESULTS  maintained  over a 5-year period.
The  results  of  simulation  I  indicate  an  im-
Equations  1-11  were  used to  analyze  the  im-  mediate decline  in wheat imports of 3.6 percent
pact  of  exogenous  increases  in  the  resale  and  and decline of 4.0 percent from the base value by
producer  support  prices  of  rice  and  wheat  on  year 5. However, this policy by itself is not suffi-
Japanese  rice  stocks,  wheat  imports,  and  rice  cient to bring about a large decrease  in rice pro-
exports.  The  model  was  first  solved for a base  duction.  Rice  stocks  decline  7.7  percent  from
period,  year  1, using  the  observed  values  of all  their  base  1973  level  by  year  5 because  of  in-
predetermined variables.  The price changes were  creased  rice  consumption  and  decreased  rice
introduced into the model in the second year, and  production.  Rice exports  decline  4.2 percent by
the  model was  solved  recursively for 5 years  to  year  5 as  a  result  of reduced  availability  of
estimate  the  time  paths  of  adjustment  to  the  surplus stocks.
8 The version  of Newton's  Method  used is contained  in the TROLL  Simulation Package.  (See MIT  Center for Computational  Research in Economics and  Management
Science for a description.)
9 The increase  in the retail  wheat  noodle  price  was limited to  .4 of the increase  in the wheat  resale price:  wheat  represents  about  40 percent of the cost of the  noodles.
137TABLE  3.  Comparison of Actual  1973  Values  with Solution Values for  1973 and  Simulation  Results
Base
Actual  solution  Simulation  I  projected  values  Simulation  II  projected  values
Variable  value  value
Percentagec  Percentage
c
1973  1973  Percentageb  change  dPercentage  change
Year  2
a
change  year  5  year  2  change  year  5
Wheat  imports  5353  5400  5208  -3.6  -4.0  5195  -3.8  -5.2
Wheat  production  202  155  170  9.6  25.5  182  17.4  64.5
Rice  exports  392  418  418  0.  -4.2  418  0.  -26.5
Rice  production  12149  12143  12103  -.3  -.4  11920  -1.8  -4.0
Rice  stocks  4095  4260  4196  -1.5  -7.7  4012  -5.8  -48.9
a Increase  in the relative wheat to rice resale price  of 11 percent and an increase  in the relative wheat to rice producer support
price of 2.4 percent.
b Percent change  of year 2 from the base solution  value.
c Percent change  of year 5 value  from  the base  solution  value.
d Increase  in  the rice diversion  payment from 400,000  yen  per hectare  to 550,000 yen  per hectare  in  addition to  changes  in
Simulation  I.
Simulation  II presents the scenario  of increas-  The results of this analysis indicate a decline in
ing the  rice  diversion payment  by  34  percent  in  wheat imports of about 4 to 5 percent (from  1973
addition  to the changes  introduced in simulation  base  values),  all  other  things  equal,  from  per-
I. A similar percentage increase in the rice diver-  centage  changes  in  producer  and  consumer
sion  payment  took  place  in  the  1978-79  crop  prices,  and  in diversion payments  introduced  in
year.' 0 The  simulation results  show  that the in-  recent  years.  The  decrease  in  projected  wheat
crease in the diversion payment results  in an in-  imports in the analysis may be underestimated  as
crease  in wheat  production  of  17  percent  and  a  the  new  diversion  payment  levels  make  wheat
decrease  in rice  production  of 2 percent  in year  production  competitive  with  rice  in  contrast  to
2.11  Wheat  imports  decline  4  percent  in year 2,  the  period  of  estimation.  Further  increases  in
and  5 percent  in  year 5. This  decline  in  wheat  wheat  producer  and  resale  prices  in  following
imports  is  coupled  with  a larger  percentage  de-  years  may  work  further  to  decrease  wheat  im-
cline  in  rice  exports  of  26  percent  by  year  5.  ports,  all other things constant.
Thus,  these  rice  policies  result  in  decreased  At  the  same  time,  the  paddy  field  diversion
wheat imports and a decreased supply of surplus  program appears  to  be an effective policy  in re-
rice, which in turn reduces rice exports, all other  ducing  surplus stocks.  However,  its success  de-
things equal.  pends  upon  such factors  as  weather  and  future
The diversion policy in combination  with pric-  demands  for  increases  in  rice  support  prices.
ing policies  results  in a decline of 50 percent  in  Unusually favorable  weather in Japan resulted in
rice  stocks from the  base  value  by year 5, or  a  bumper  rice  crops  in  1978  and  1979  and  in in-
decline  of  1,962,000  metric  tons  (brown  basis).  creased  rice  stocks,  despite  the  diversion  pro-
This  decline  is  short of the  70-percent  decrease  gram  effort.
from the  1979-80 stock levels estimated  by FAS  r 
that was desired  by Japanese  officials  (Ministry  Afurther note of caution to the interpretation thatof  Agricultus  desire,  Forestry,  by Japan  ese  officials  (Ministry  Food  of these results  is that Japan  agreed to limit rice
oAg  rency)ultu,  F  ,  ad  F,  F  d  exports  to  about  400,000  tons  (milled)  over  a
period of 4 years in a recent U.S.-Japan  bilateral
agreement.  Because the rice export equation was
CONCLUSIONS  estimated  over  a period in which such  an agree-
Japanese  rice  and  wheat  policies  affect  trade  ment did not exist, the estimated relationship  be-
through  their  impact  on  Japan's  wheat  imports  tween rice stocks and rice exports may not hold.
and  rice  exports.'2 The  United  States  has  an  This limit on exports, while  working to stabilize
interest in the trade  effects  of these  policies be-  rice export markets,  will  place increased  depen-
cause  Japan  is a  major importer of U.S.  wheat  dence upon feed disposal programs  and/or diver-
(10 percent of the value of U.S. wheat exports in  sion  programs  to  reduce  accumulated  rice
1979).  In  addition,  Japanese  rice  exports  com-  stocks. Increased  reliance  on rice diversion pro-
pete  with U.S.  rice  exports  in traditional  Asian  grams  may work  to reduce  wheat imports  addi-
markets.  '  tionally  in the  future.
'° This policy simulation represents an increase in the diversion payment received  by rice producers from 400,000  yen per hectare,  to 550,000 yen per hectare.  Rice farmers
actually  receive different incentives  for retiring rice area, depending  on the crop they  decide  to cultivate.
" The effect  of the diversion  payment  on wheat acreage  should be  interpreted  with  a degree of caution, because the  diversion  payment  variable was  not significant  at
acceptable  levels  in equation  2.
" Future  feed grain  trade  may be affected by  these impacts, but  is not  discussed  in this  paper.
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